Adam Smith is today known as the founding father of economics. But by profession he was a university professor, holding a chair in moral philosophy. It was in this capacity that in 1759 he published the first of his two books. Neither can be fully appreciated without the other — and both deserve our careful attention now, perhaps more than ever.
Smith’s first book was The Theory of Moral Sentiments. An instant hit, it early on caught the attention of such prominent admirers as Edmund Burke, David Hume, and John Adams. The aim of the book is at once descriptive and prescriptive. It is descriptive insofar as it provides an account of the moral institutions that enable a free society to function. And it is prescriptive insofar as it seeks to cultivate the qualities of character that allow free individuals to lead flourishing lives and free societies to prosper and persist.
The Theory of Moral Sentiments covers a great deal of ground, tackling topics ranging from justice and judgment to conscience and love. But its most original and important contributions arguably come on three specific fronts: its theory of sympathy, its concept of the impartial spectator, and its vision of virtue.
Smith begins The Theory of Moral Sentiments by examining sympathy. Sympathy, in his view, is hardwired into us as part of our nature. Its function is to encourage us to feel some degree of what other people feel; literally, it is a sort of “feeling with.” Smith’s examples drive this home: When we see another suffering, we feel that person’s pain. And when we see those we love happy and healthy, we feel their joy.
Sympathy is thus something we naturally extend to others. But it has another side. As sympathetic beings, we don’t just give sympathy to others: We also want to receive it from them. When we’re hurting, we want to know that others aren’t indifferent to our pain; when we’re celebrating, we don’t want to do it alone. Sympathy, then, is important on both the social and the moral level. In short: Sympathy is the glue that holds society together, by creating bonds between individuals — bonds stronger and healthier for having emerged naturally and spontaneously from the bottom up rather than being imposed top-down.
Smith’s treatment of sympathy is powerful, but it also raises a question. If sympathy is something we feel, does everybody and everything deserve ours? Or might it be that some individuals or causes are worthier of our attachment than others? Smith often emphasizes the difference between what the world praises and what is genuinely worthy of praise. But to know this we have to go beyond mere sympathy and use our judgment. And to help us develop this judgment, Smith turns to his “impartial spectator.”
The impartial spectator, as Smith describes him, occupies a perspective we today might call “objective.” To reach it, we have to separate ourselves from our private concerns and learn to see the world free of the distorting lens of our self-interest. The result is a clear-eyed view, one that enables us to take in all the facts and see matters as they really are.
This of course is no easy task. Adam Smith knew as well as anyone that we are attached to our interests. So why did he think it was so important for us to do this? His concern was simple: A society of free and self-interested individuals cannot function if they are unable to appreciate the interests and rights of others. The result of such a failure could only be an unsustainable society of selfishness — precisely the anarchic state of nature that Smith, like other theorists of liberalism, sought to overcome.
A third contribution of The Theory of Moral Sentiments is its theory of virtue. Smith draws freely on the insights of both ancient and Enlightenment virtue theorists. But he adds to these theories a profound sense of the precise virtues we most need as citizens of modern market societies.
Read Full Article »
