The Neo-Confucian Bluff

The Neo-Confucian Bluff
AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein, File

After being denounced during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76) as inconsistent with Marxist ideals, Confucianism has made an astonishing return to official favor in China. In 2010, I participated in the first Nishan Forum, which marked a dramatic and orchestrated confirmation that Confucian ideals, or a version of them, would once again be a central feature of Chinese national identity. Marxism “with Chinese characteristics” suddenly seemed to be eclipsed by a Confucian fervor.

Encouraged by China’s triumphant successes in the global market, many believed that a Confucian revival would promote greater openness to Western ethical and political ideals. When I was asked, quite unexpectedly, to give the opening plenary address to the World Conference on Sinology in Beijing in November, 2012, I took the invitation to be a sign of my Chinese colleagues’ desire to discover a consonance between East and West, for the Confucian inheritance has much in common with the classical and Christian traditions. Take the example of political economy and extreme income disparity, an issue that is pressing in both China and the United States. Plato, in his Republic, famously argued that the health of the state depended on a productive and vigorous middle class. A chief duty of “the guardians” is to ensure as much as possible that labor receives just reward, and that extremes of wealth and poverty do not undermine the stability of the state. This is a non-utopian view, which does not seek perfect equality, but instead seeks to moderate dangerous extremes. The Confucian tradition is based on a similar realism. “The head of a State or Family,” Confucius is recorded as saying, “is not concerned lest his people should be poor, but only lest what they have should be ill apportioned.”

A similar shared emphasis is observable between the Confucian classics and Scripture. Many counsels of the ancient Chinese sages find their counterparts in the moral philosophy of the biblical sages and poets. The biblical authors present a case for just compensation and care for the poor in terms of divine command, whereas Confucian texts stress a pragmatic concern for political stability. But the thrust is the same.

It is harder to discuss such commonalities in China today. In just a few years, Confucianism has acquired a new face, with two sides. Moderates such as Chen Ming and the distinguished Tu Weiming regard the tradition as potentially providing a kind of civil religion for China, a source of moral authority and perhaps political legitimacy for rulers who accept its general regula and moral precepts. This view is largely consistent with classical Confucianism.

More radical is the proposal of ­Jiang Qing. He and his followers wish to see a Confucian state religion institutionalized as an alternative to Western liberal democratic ­ideals, to which they are hostile. Jiang’s cultural nationalism imagines public rules and rituals. For instance, participants in the Nishan Forum were given “Neo-Confucian” vestments to wear in the general ceremonies and at academic sessions. Drawing on part of the 1982 Constitution, ­Jiang’s Neo-­Confucianism emphasizes Chinese ethnicity, language, culture, and history. As Lei Sun, professor of Confucian philosophy at Tongji University, puts it, “Political legitimacy in China has shifted from a basis in revolution to a basis in Chinese history and culture.” This in itself might seem a welcome development. But for some Neo-­Confucians, it is not ­nearly enough.

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